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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Few courts have dealt directly with the issue of whether to protect 
an employee’s production of confidential documents in Title VII 
retaliation litigation.1  Despite the lack of case law, the conflict is very 
 
* The author would like to thank Prof. Stefan J. Padfield of The University of Akron School of Law 
for his immense help in preparing this article for publication.  The author would also like to thank 
Prof. Richard L. Aynes of The University of Akron School of Law for his insightful comments. 
 1. Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 722 (6th Cir. 2008).  At the Sixth Circuit, 
Niswander was argued before Judges Gilman, Rogers, and McKeague.  Id.  Title VII’s anti-
1
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real.2  On one hand, employers want to protect themselves from the 
improper or unnecessary dissemination of confidential documents in 
connection with a Title VII lawsuit.  On the other hand, employees have 
a statutory right to participate in the charging process and to oppose 
unlawful employer conduct, which often involves confidential corporate 
documents.3 
When an employer terminates an employee for disseminating 
confidential documents, Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision provides 
the employee with protection for two types of activity:  participation and 
opposition.4  Generally, the provision grants more protection to a person 
who is participating in a lawsuit than to one who is merely opposing 
unlawful conduct.5 But, courts have struggled to interpret the breadth of 
the participation clause.6 
 
retaliation provision forbids any employer from discriminating against any of its employees because 
the employee opposed any practice made unlawful under Title VII, or because the employee made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing 
under Title VII.  42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a) (2008). 
 2. See Niswander, 529 F.3d 714.  Besides Niswander, other examples include O'Day v. 
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., where an employee rummaged through files in his supervisor’s 
office, copied several documents, and showed them to fellow employees.  79 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 
1996).  In Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., an employee copied information from a book that was left 
out in the open and disclosed that information to counsel.  No. C-1-03-033, 2005 WL 3448036 (S.D. 
Ohio Dec.15, 2005).  In Kempcke v. Monsanto Co., an employee was fired for refusing to return 
confidential documents he provided to his attorney.  132 F.3d 442 (8th Cir. 1998).  Finally, in Shoaf 
v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., an employee provided a coworker who was participating in a Title VII 
action with safety violation reports, personnel information, and emails.  294 F. Supp. 2d 746, 752 
(M.D.N.C. 2003). 
 3. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 726.  In Niswander, the Sixth Circuit attempted to balance the 
employer’s “legitimate and substantial interest in keeping its personnel records and agency 
documents confidential” while protecting the employee's need to produce documents in discovery.  
Id. (quoting Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1036 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
 4. 45A Am. Jur. 2d Job Discrimination § 215; see infra notes 72-88 and accompanying text 
describing the difference between participation and opposition. 
 5. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 726.  Typically, opposition activity must be reasonable for the 
anti-retaliation provision to apply.  Id.  On the other hand, participation activity is generally not held 
to a standard of reasonableness.  Id. 
 6. See Marilee L. Miller, Comment, The Employer Strikes Back:  The Case for a Broad 
Reading of Title VII’s Bar on Retaliation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 505 (2006).  Currently, there is a 
debate between three standards for determining whether employer conduct constitutes retaliation 
under the statute:  (1) the Ultimate Employment Actions Standard; (2) the Materially Adverse 
Standard; and (3) the Deference Standard/EEOC Standard.  Id. at 513-28.  The Ultimate 
Employment Actions Standard is the strictest approach and limits retaliation protection only to 
actions affecting wages, hiring, firing, and demotion.  Id. at 513-14.  The Materially Adverse 
Standard expands protection to actions that materially change the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment.  Id. at 515.  The EEOC Standard is the most lenient.  Id. at 520-22.  It focuses on the 
effect of the alleged retaliation and expands protection to cover any employer action which deterred 
participation.  Id. 
2
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In Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., the Sixth Circuit recently ruled 
that confidential documents produced in response to a formal production 
request must be relevant to the production request in order for the 
production to constitute protected participation.7  The Sixth Circuit 
analyzes irrelevant document production under the opposition clause 
using a six-part reasonableness test.8 
This article is a case note on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Niswander.  The position of this note is that for the purpose of 
establishing a retaliation claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
3(a), courts should consider the good-faith production of confidential 
documents in response to a formal request for discovery as participation 
activity, not opposition activity.9  Whether the produced documents are 
relevant to a formal discovery request should not factor into the 
participation analysis.10  The determining question should be whether 
the employee acted in good faith.11 
This note will first describe the factual background of the 
Niswander decision and provide a background for Title VII retaliation 
litigation.12  Second, it will discuss why Congress intended to allow 
irrelevant or provocative activity to be protected under the Title VII anti-
retaliation statute.13  Next, it will argue that a good-faith standard is 
better than a relevance standard.14  Then, it will contrast the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision in Niswander with that of other circuits and offer an 
alternative method for the Sixth Circuit’s analysis.15  Finally, it will 
examine the possible ramifications that Niswander may have on Title 
VII discovery.16 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Factual Background 
In December 2003, Kathy Niswander opted-in to a class action 
lawsuit claiming that Cincinnati Insurance Co. (“CIC”) discriminated 
 
 7. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 726-27. 
 8. Id.; see infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 97-231 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 97-231 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 118-60 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 17-96 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 104-17 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 118-60 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 172-212 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 214-31 and accompanying text. 
3
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against women in violation of the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 
206(d).17  As part of discovery in the class action, both parties agreed to 
a Stipulated Protective Order, which allowed them to exchange 
confidential information.18  After joining the class action, Niswander 
believed that her supervisor retaliated against her,19 prompting her to file 
a retaliation claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) in October 2005.20 
As part of the ongoing equal pay litigation, CIC formally requested 
that Niswander produce documents related to her equal pay claim.21  The 
requests for production were arguably vague and broadly worded.22  One 
request stated:  “Please produce any and all documents which reflect, 
refer or relate to Plaintiff's claims against Cincinnati Insurance 
Company, including but not limited to, memoranda, correspondence, 
notes, e-mail and faxes to or from any supervisor, manager or employee 
of Cincinnati Insurance Company.”23  Another request stated:  “Please 
produce all documents which reflect, relate or concern the allegation of 
Plaintiff that Defendant has discriminated against her based on 
gender.”24 
Niswander believed that the scope of the request included 
documents relating to her retaliation claim as well as her equal pay 
claim.25  As a result, she subsequently produced confidential documents 
 
 17. Final Brief for the Appellant at 7, Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 
2008) (No. 07-3738), 2007 WL 5066236. 
 18. Id. at 8.  The protective order provided that “[e]ither party, may at the time of production, 
designate such information as ‘confidential’ and the information so designated shall thereafter be 
subject to the provisions of this order.”  Id. 
 19. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 717.  The summary of the alleged retaliation is as follows:  prior 
to Niswander joining in the equal pay lawsuit, her supervisor would call once per week and discuss 
her work.  Id.  After Niswander opted-in to the lawsuit, the supervisor stopped calling her.  Id.  He 
would only e-mail Niswander.  Id.  In September 2004, Niswander filed a complaint of retaliation 
with CIC's Human Resources Department.  Id.  Niswander requested a new supervisor in August of 
2005, but her request was denied.  Id.  Niswander was put on CIC's Progressive Problem Resolution 
Program in September of 2005.  Id.  This was the first time Niswander had been placed in this 
program since she began working for CIC in March 1996.  Id. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 15. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 718.  [Niswander] admitted in her deposition that she had “no 
documents to support an equal pay [claim].”  Instead, she sent documents that she believed were 
relevant to CIC's alleged acts of retaliation against her. Some of the documents that Niswander sent 
were copies of e-mail correspondence with her supervisors related to her job performance. Other 
documents, however, were claim-file documents that allegedly would jog her memory regarding 
instances of retaliation, but that did not, in and of themselves, contain evidence of retaliation.  In 
4
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to her lawyers that were wholly unrelated to the equal pay claim.26  
Niswander’s lawyers turned the documents over to CIC’s lawyers, who 
then turned the documents over to CIC.27  CIC subsequently fired 
Niswander for violating the company’s privacy policy.28  Niswander 
filed suit in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, claiming 
that CIC unlawfully retaliated against Niswander by firing her in 
response to the production of documents.29 
B. Procedural History 
At the district court level, both CIC and Niswander filed for 
summary judgment.30  CIC claimed that it had a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for firing Niswander because she had violated 
 
sending the documents to her lawyers, some of which included information about CIC's 
policyholders, Niswander “thought everything was confidential” and that “anything [she] produced 
was all between the two attorneys, being Cincinnati Insurance['s attorney] and mine.” 
Id. 
 26. Id.  Niswander never actually read the request for production, but instead was acting on 
instructions from her lawyers.  Id. at 721.  Niswander produced the documents at issue specifically 
in response to a letter from her lawyer, which stated: 
Finally, if you have any documents related to your employment at CIC which you have 
not already sent in, please send them immediately.  I will also be sending you a letter 
about some specific “holes” in our discovery responses which we need to address, but I 
also need you to look around your house and office for any documents you think might 
be even remotely helpful to our case and send them in right away.  If we do not produce 
the documents to CIC and cooperate in discovery, we will not be able to use the 
documents at all. 
Reply Brief for the Appellant at 5-6, Niswander, 529 F.3d 714 (No. 07-3738). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 718.  Niswander’s termination letter stated that CIC had “learned 
that [Niswander] took confidential and proprietary documents, including documents from claim 
files, containing private and confidential information about insureds and claimants without 
permission for uses unrelated and unnecessary to the performance of your employment by CIC, in 
knowing violation of various company policies.”  Id.  Niswander based her argument, that CIC’s 
proffered non-discriminatory reason for firing her was pre-textual, partly on the fact that CIC did 
not treat the documents as confidential.  Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at *28.  Despite 
the fact that the stipulated protective order allowed for either party to mark documents as 
confidential, CIC never designated the documents as such.  Id.  This was evidence that the 
disclosure of the documents was not sufficient motivation for CIC to fire Niswander.  Id. 
 29. See generally Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 5:06CV1086, 2007 WL 1189350 
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 2007).    
 30. Id. at *1.  CIC moved for summary judgment on the ground that Niswander could not 
establish a prima facie claim of retaliation.  Id. at *5.  Niswander moved for summary judgment 
against CIC’s claim of conversion of its documents.  Id. at *13.  While both motions were granted, 
Niswander’s grant of summary judgment was not appealed. Therefore, conversion of the documents 
is not an issue in the Sixth Circuit’s analysis.  Niswander, 529 F.3d at 717. 
5
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multiple company policies.31  Niswander argued that CIC implicitly 
authorized her disclosure of documents by way of CIC’s formal request 
for production of documents.32  Niswander further argued that because 
she produced the documents within a formal discovery request, her 
activity was protected as participation under Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision.33  The district court granted summary judgment to CIC.34 
The key to the district court’s analysis was determining that 
Niswander’s production of documents was not a protected activity.35  
Niswander had argued that the production of documents was protected 
under Title VII’s participation clause.36  However, after analyzing 
Watkins v. Ford Motor Company37 and O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas 
Helicopter Co.,38 the district court formed its opinion instead under the 
opposition clause balancing test formulated in O’Day.39  The court 
likened Niswander’s conduct to that of an employee stealing 
documents40 and found that Niswander’s production of documents was 
 
 31.  Niswander, 2007 WL 1189350, at *2.  CIC specifically alleged that Niswander’s actions 
violated CIC’s Privacy Policy, Code of Conduct, and Conflict of Interest Policies.  Id. 
 32. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at *26.  CIC’s privacy policy had an exception 
for disclosures authorized by management.  Id. 
 33. Id. at *14-15.  The participation clause inarguably provides for broader protection than the 
opposition clause.  Niswander, 529 F.3d at 720-21. 
 34. Niswander, 2007 WL 1189350, at *1. 
 35. Id. at *7. 
 36. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at *5-6. 
 37. No. C-1-03-033, 2005 WL 3448036, (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2005). 
 38. 79 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 39. Niswander, 2007 WL 1189350, at *8-10.  In the opposition clause analysis of its opinion, 
the Sixth Circuit refined the district court’s test and established six factors to weigh in determining 
whether the dissemination of documents, in any context, may constitute reasonable opposition 
conduct: 
(1) how the documents were obtained, (2) to whom the documents were produced, (3) 
the content of the documents, both in terms of the need to keep the information 
confidential and its relevance to the employee's claim of unlawful conduct, (4) why the 
documents were produced, including whether the production was in direct response to a 
discovery request, (5) the scope of the employer's privacy policy, and (6) the ability of 
the employee to preserve the evidence in a manner that does not violate the employer's 
privacy policy. 
Niswander, 529 F.3d at 726.  See Nicholas Strohmayer, Note, Drawing the Line:  Niswander's 
Balance Between Employer Confidentiality Interests and Employee Title VII Anti-Retaliation 
Rights, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1037 (2010) (critiquing the Sixth Circuit’s six-factor opposition clause 
test). 
 40. Niswander, 2007 WL 1189350, at *7-9.  In Watkins, the employee copied confidential 
documents he found lying around the office and provided them to his attorney prior to initiating a 
lawsuit.  Id.  In O’Day, the employee obtained documents by rummaging through a drawer in his 
supervisor’s office marked private.  Id.  Unlike Watkins and O’Day, Niswander worked at home and 
had possession of all the documents she ultimately turned over.  Id.  The District Court 
acknowledged this fact but determined that, “like the plaintiff in Watkins, [Niswander] began 
6
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unreasonable opposition.41  The district court never analyzed whether 
Niswander’s conduct was participation under Title VII.42 
C. Competing Arguments 
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, CIC successfully argued that 
confidential documents produced in discovery must be relevant to the 
production request in order to be considered participation under Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation statute.43  CIC argued that because Niswander 
produced confidential documents, which were not related to the equal 
Pay lawsuit, the documents were not actually in response to the 
discovery request.44  Thus, Niswander was not participating in the Equal 
pay claim when she produced the documents.45  CIC argued, in the 
alternative, that even if the court analyzed Niswander’s conduct as 
participation, CIC had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason to fire her 
because she violated the company’s confidentiality policy.46 
 
looking through those files for specific information relevant and helpful to her future claim of 
retaliation, not a business purpose, and provided these confidential documents to her attorney 
without Defendant's permission and clearly in violation of Defendant's confidentiality policies of 
which she was aware.”  Id. at *9. 
 41. Niswander, 2007 WL 1189350, at *10.  (“In applying the balancing test of O'Day to the 
instant case, the Court finds that Defendant's interest in ensuring compliance with its policies of 
privacy and the law, and maintaining the confidentiality of its clients' personal information 
outweighs Plaintiff's interest in preserving what she considered to be evidence of unlawful 
retaliation on the part of Defendant.  This is so especially in light of the fact that Plaintiff could have 
preserved this evidence without violating the law and her employer's policy and trust as she could 
have taken notes of the incidents that she felt spurned retaliation instead of taking pictures and 
claims file information that jogged her memory of these incidents and giving them to her attorney.  
Moreover, this “evidence” that Plaintiff handed over to her attorney does not prove retaliation in 
and of itself as Plaintiff herself admitted that the documents that she gave her attorney relating to 
claims file information only served to trigger her memory about incidents which she believed 
constituted retaliation.”). 
 42. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 721.  The Sixth Circuit even acknowledges that the lower court 
inexplicably failed to analyze Niswander’s participation argument.  Id. 
 43. Brief of Defendant-Appellee at *24, Niswander, 529 F.3d 714 (No. 07-3738) 2007 WL 
5066233.  The Defendant characterizes Niswander’s activity as collecting, removing, and 
disseminating confidential documents to a third-party for a non-business purpose.  Id. at *22.  From 
the Defendant’s view, Niswander was not responding to a request for production when she handed 
over the documents.  See generally, id.  She was merely preparing for a future retaliation claim that, 
if true, was properly analyzed under an opposition clause analysis.  Id. at *23.  One flaw in this 
logic however, is that Niswander already had a retaliation claim pending with the EEOC. Final Brief 
for Appellant, supra note 17, at *7. 
 44. Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 43, at *23-24. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at *30-31.  The Defendant compared Niswander’s disclosure of confidential 
documents with that of the Plaintiff in Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, No. CIV-04-1433-F, 2006 WL 
2987728 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 17, 2006).  However, in Vaughn the plaintiff’s disclosure was not part of 
a formal discovery request.  Id. at *2.  Like O’Day and Watkins, Vaughn involved disclosure prior 
7
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Niswander countered that her actions constituted participation, not 
opposition, and thus the district court erred in analyzing her claim under 
an opposition clause standard.47  Niswander reasoned that she was 
participating in the discovery process of an equal pay lawsuit by 
producing documents in response to a formal request for production.48  
She just did not understand the scope of the discovery request given to 
her.49 
Niswander’s lawyer sent her two letters, one of which stated:  “If 
you have any documents related to your employment at CIC which you 
have not already sent in, please send them to me immediately.”50  The 
letter continued:  “I also need you to look around your house and office 
for any documents you think might be even remotely helpful to our case 
and send them in right away. If we do not produce the documents to CIC 
and cooperate in discovery, we will not be able to use the documents at 
all.”51 
Niswander acknowledged that the documents produced were 
irrelevant to her equal pay claim. However, she believed the produced 
documents were in response to an overly broad discovery request.52  
Niswander further argued that CIC’s proffered reason for firing her was 
pretext because CIC took no steps to mitigate the damage that 
Niswander allegedly caused.53  CIC’s attorney in charge of protecting 
privacy conducted no investigation of the alleged breach, did not view 
the documents that were disclosed, and never informed customers of the 
supposed breach of confidentiality.54 
 
to filing a lawsuit.  Id.  The Defendant also suggested that the participation clause would not protect 
Niswander because a violation of company policy is per se bad faith conduct.   Brief of Defendant-
Appellee, supra note 43, at *31.  This logic is flawed because it implies that Niswander deliberately 
violated the company policy, but Niswander believed she was complying with CIC’s request for 
production, thus she did not believe she was violating company policy.  Niswander, 529 F.3d at 718. 
 47. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at *23-24. 
 48. Id. at *17. 
 49. See Niswander, 529 F.3d at 718. 
 50. Id. (emphasis in original).  Niswander’s attorney’s alleged failure to properly instruct 
Niswander on the scope of discovery is the subject matter of a current malpractice suit.  See 
Niswander v. Price, Waicukauski & Riley, LLC, No. 1-08-CV-1325 (S.D. Ind. filed Oct. 2, 2008). 
 51. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 718. 
 52. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 
 53. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at *29-30.  Niswander argued that CIC should 
have taken steps to protect the documents from further dissemination such as mark them as 
confidential and place them under the stipulated protective order.  Id. 
 54. Id. at *30. 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss2/6
11_LEDGER_WESTERN 2.18.11.DOCM 2/22/2011  2:20 PM 
2011] RELEVANCE IS IRRELEVANT 591 
D. Sixth Circuit’s Holding 
The Sixth Circuit analyzed Niswander’s actions under both the 
opposition clause and the participation clause of Title VII.55  The court 
affirmed the lower court’s opposition clause analysis.56  But, in 
analyzing the participation clause, the court held that the production of 
confidential documents within a formal request for discovery can be 
considered participation for the purposes of establishing a retaliation 
claim under Title VII only where the documents are relevant to the 
underlying action.57  The court gave two primary reasons for refusing 
protection.  First, the court was concerned about the employer’s need to 
protect confidential information.58  Second, the court did not want to 
immunize any future bad faith conduct of employees.59  If Niswander's 
conduct was protected participation, then, employees would have “near-
immunity” for their actions in connection with anti-discrimination 
lawsuits.60 
Niswander neither appealed for rehearing en banc nor filed a 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 
III.  STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“the Act”) is a legislative milestone 
of the Civil Rights Movement.61  Its enactment prohibited discrimination 
based on race, color, sex, religion, or national origin62 in many everyday 
 
 55. See Niswander, 529 F.3d 714. 
 56. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  Two concurring opinions discuss the weight of 
the factors in the O’Day opposition clause analysis.  However, because the focus of this note is the 
Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the participation clause, a discussion of the opposition clause 
analysis or the concurring opinions is omitted.  See Niswander, 529 F.3d at 729 (McKeague, J., 
Gilman, J., concurring). 
 57. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 722.  The Sixth Circuit held that “[a]n individual's delivery of 
relevant documents during the discovery process or the giving of testimony at a deposition clearly 
falls within the ambit of participating . . . in a Title VII proceeding.”  Id. (citing Hashimoto v. 
Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 1997)).  The Court went on to analyze whether Niswander’s 
conduct would constitute opposition activity.  However, because this note argues that Niswander’s 
production should have been deemed participation, the author will ignore the Court’s analysis of the 
opposition clause.  See Niswander, 529 F.3d 714. 
 58. Id. at 722. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Rebecca E. Zietlow, To Secure These Rights:  Congress, Courts, and the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 945, 984 (2005).  Indeed, Congress altered the structure of 
federalism by deciding that it could regulate private discrimination.  Id. 
 62.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.  It is important to note that some forms of sex discrimination are not 
outlawed by Title VII.  Id.  Specifically, where sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for a 
job, discrimination in hiring and employing based on sex is still allowed.  Id.  However, courts 
9
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transactions.63  Title VII of the Act was designed to eliminate 
discrimination in employment64 and remains one of the most litigated 
provisions today.65 
A. Retaliation Under Title VII 
While Title VII grants considerable protection to an employee from 
discrimination, that protection is meaningless if the employer can 
retaliate against an employee for making a complaint.66  Title VII’s anti-
 
narrowly construe this exception and will not extend it to compensation or terms of employment.  
See EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding a bona fide 
occupational qualification defense does not extend to discriminatory assignment of health insurance 
benefits).   Oddly enough, the protection against sex discrimination was not originally part of Title 
VII, but added in an amendment from Representative Howard Smith, a Democrat from Virginia.  Jo 
Freeman, How 'Sex' Got Into Title VII:  Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW 
& INEQ. 163, 174-77 (1990-1991).  Smith opposed granting federal civil rights protections, which 
led many to believe that the amendment was added as an attempt at killing the legislation.  Id.  
When the amendment was introduced, many southern Democrats who spoke in favor of adding 
protection based on sex eventually voted against the Civil Rights Act.  Id.  Smith, however, 
disagreed with this suggestion and maintained his sincerity towards woman’s rights.  Id. 
 63. See JODY FEDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22251, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES:  
A PRIMER  (2005) at *2.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination in regards to voter 
registration, public accommodations involved in interstate commerce (motels, restaurants, etc.), 
access to public facilities and public schools, agencies receiving federal funding, and employment.  
Id.  It also expanded the power of the Civil Rights Commission, required reporting of voter 
registration data, and eased the requirements for removing civil rights cases to federal courts.  Id. 
 64. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006).  “The 
antidiscrimination provision seeks a workplace where individuals are not discriminated against 
because of their racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based status.”  Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01 (1973)). 
 65. Of the 93,277 charges filed with the EEOC in 2009, 68,710 were Title VII charges.  
EEOC Enforcement Statistics, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm and 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/titlevii.cfm (last visited March 6, 2010).  Of the 
281 merit suits filed by the EEOC in 2009, 188 were based on Title VII claims.  EEOC Litigation 
Statistics, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm, (last visited Mar. 6, 
2010). 
 66. Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 203-04 (2nd Cir. 2003).  Courts have consistently 
recognized that the explicit language of § 704(a)'s participation clause is expansive and seemingly 
contains no limitations. See, e.g., Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1353 (11th Cir. 
1999) (“The words ‘participate in any manner’ express Congress' intent to confer ‘exceptionally 
broad protection’ upon employees covered by Title VII.”); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 
561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1052 (2000); Glover v. South Carolina Law 
Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court has noted that “[r]ead 
naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning,” and thus, as long as “Congress did not add 
any language limiting the breadth of that word,” the term “any” must be given literal effect. United 
States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997).  Id.  See also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 
(1997).  The overarching purpose of Title VII is to resolve discrimination issues at the local level by 
protecting employees who report discrimination to their employers.  See id. 
10
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retaliation provision was drafted to address this issue.67  The anti-
retaliation provision is actually broader in scope than the anti-
discrimination provision.68  The anti-retaliation provision states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed 
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this 
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing 
under this subchapter.69 
A prima facie case of retaliation requires the plaintiff to prove, 
among other things, that she engaged in a protected activity and suffered 
an adverse employment action as a result of engaging in the protected 
activity.70  In analyzing whether an employee has engaged in a protected 
 
 67. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.  The “purpose of the anti-retaliation 
provision is to prevent Title VII claims from being deterred.”  Heuer v. Weil-McLain, 203 F.3d 
1021, 1023 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 68. The scope of the anti-retaliation provision extends protection beyond “workplace-related 
or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm.”  Colon-Perez v. Dep’t of Health of Puerto Rico, 
623 F. Supp. 2d 230, 241 (D. Puerto Rico 2009) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006)).   
The anti-discrimination provision seeks a workplace where individuals are not 
discriminated against because of their status, while the anti-retaliation provision seeks to 
prevent an employer from interfering with an employee's efforts to secure or advance 
enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees. To secure the first objective, Congress needed 
only to prohibit employment-related discrimination. But this would not achieve the 
second objective because it would not deter the many forms that effective retaliation can 
take, therefore failing to fully achieve the anti-retaliation provision's purpose of 
“[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” 
Burlington, 548 U.S. at 54 (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346). 
 69. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a). 
 70. George Chamberlin, Cause of Action for Discharge from Employment in Retaliation for 
the Exercise of Rights Protected by Title VII, 4 C.O.A. 2d 331 § 3 (2010) (1994).  See also EEOC 
Compliance Manual, No. 915.003, Section 8-II(A), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.html (last visited March 6, 2010).  To establish a prima facie 
case of retaliation in the Sixth Circuit, an employee must prove that:  (1) he or she engaged in 
protected activity, (2) the employer knew of the exercise of the protected right, (3) an adverse 
employment action was subsequently taken against the employee, and (4) there was a causal 
connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.  Niswander v. 
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 720 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Ct., 
201 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2000)).  This formulation is essentially the same as the EEOC 
description.  EEOC Compliance Manual, supra.  However, the formulation adds the requirement 
that the employer must know that the employee was exercising protected rights.  Id.  A requirement 
that an employer know of the employee’s exercise of a protected right is part of the prima facie 
retaliation case in some circuits; in others, it is not.  Chamberlin, supra.  In circuits where employer 
knowledge is not a part of the prima facie case, this question is addressed under the causation 
element.  Id.  After the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to 
the employer to show a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.  
11
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activity, the anti-discrimination statute recognizes two categories of 
activity:  participation and opposition.71  This distinction is important 
due to the different levels of protection given to each activity.72 
1.  Participation 
Courts broadly define participation to mean all activity surrounding 
the filing of a Title VII charge with the EEOC or the filing of a lawsuit 
under Title VII.73  Once a person files a charge or initiates a lawsuit, the 
anti-retaliation statute protects their participation throughout the 
litigation.74  The participant need not win on the merits of the underlying 
charge in order to have a retaliation claim against her employer.75  For 
example, an employee who files a charge of harassment against her boss 
will still be deemed to have been participating in the charging process 
regardless of whether the charge of harassment is proven true.76 
“Although the participation clause may be nearly absolute in 
theory, it may seldom be absolute in fact.”77  Once a participant 
establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden then shifts to the 
employer to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for taking 
 
Id. § 15.  After such a showing, the plaintiff must then show that the proffered reason either did not 
actually motivate the employer or was insufficient motivation to take the alleged retaliatory action.  
Id.  If the employer did not know that the employee exercised a protected right, it would logically 
follow that the employer could not have retaliated against the employee.  Id. 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 72. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 720. “The distinction between employee activities protected by 
the participation clause and those protected by the opposition clause is significant because federal 
courts have generally granted less protection for opposition than for participation in enforcement 
proceedings.”  Id. (quoting Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th 
Cir. 1989)). 
 73. Id.  The protection provided under the participation clause is exceptionally broad and 
extends to persons who have participated in any manner in Title VII proceedings.  Id. (citing 
Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000)).  “[O]nce the activity in question 
is found to be within the scope of the participation clause, the employee is generally protected from 
retaliation.”  Id. at 720-21 (quoting Booker, 879 F.2d at 1312 (6th Cir. 1989)). 
 74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 75. See Pasantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Products Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 506 (9th Cir. 
2000) (finding that the Participation Clause even protects charges made in bad faith).  See also 
Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759 (2d Cir. 1998).  Even when it is determined that no 
sexual harassment has occurred, an employee is still protected from retaliation for alleging that it 
occurred.  Id. 
 76. Chamberlin, supra note 70, § 5 (“Apart from evidence of actually filing a charge of 
discrimination, the plaintiff may be able to show sufficient participation in Title VII proceedings by 
evidence of attendance at an investigative hearing, providing testimony by deposition or affidavit, or 
by assisting a fellow employee in bringing a discrimination charge.”). 
 77. 5 Emp. Coord. Employment Practices § 10:18. 
12
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the adverse employment action.78  If the employer meets this burden, the 
employee must then show that the proffered non-discriminatory reason 
was pre-textual.79  The employee must show that the stated reason was 
not based in fact, did not actually motivate the employer to take the 
adverse employment action, or did not provide sufficient motivation for 
the employer.80 
2.  Opposition 
The opposition clause covers a wide variety of behavior by 
employees not protected by the participation clause.81  The goal of the 
opposition clause is to allow employees to express any concerns 
regarding discrimination, and allow employers to address those concerns 
without turning to litigation.82  In contrast to participation, opposition 
activity must be reasonable in order to receive protection under the anti-
retaliation statute.83  Courts have employed a balancing test to determine 
whether the opposition conduct is reasonable,.84  The purpose of this test 
is to balance the employer’s need to maintain an orderly workplace with 
the employee’s rights under Title VII.85  The employee must have a 
 
 78. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 79. Id.; see also Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 80. See infra notes 172-92 and accompanying text for an expanded discussion of pretext. 
 81. Chamberlin, supra note 70, § 6.  Examples of opposition activity include:  threatening to 
file a charge of discrimination, complaining about alleged discrimination on behalf of yourself or 
others, nonverbal protests against discrimination, or refusing to obey an order because one 
reasonably believes that it is discriminatory.  EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 70, Section 8-
II(B)(2). 
 82. Chamberlin, supra note 70, § 6. 
 83. Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 721 (2008) (citing Johnson v. Univ. of 
Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 580 (6th Cir. 2000)). 
 84. Id. at 725; see also EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 70, Section 8-II(B)(3)(a) (“The 
manner in which an individual protests perceived employment discrimination must be reasonable in 
order for the anti- retaliation provisions to apply.  In applying a “reasonableness” standard, courts 
and the Commission balance the right of individuals to oppose employment discrimination and the 
public's interest in enforcement of the EEO laws against an employer's need for a stable and 
productive work environment.”). 
 85. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 722.  (“A balance must be achieved between the employer's 
recognized, legitimate need to maintain an orderly workplace and to protect confidential business 
and client information, and the equally compelling need of employees to be properly safeguarded 
against retaliatory actions.  Allowing too much protection to employees for disclosing confidential 
information may perversely incentivize behavior that ought not be tolerated in the workplace—
namely, the surreptitious theft of confidential documents as potential future ammunition should the 
employee eventually feel wronged by her employer.  On the other hand, inadequate protection to 
employees might provide employers with a legally sanctioned reason to terminate an employee in 
retaliation for engaging in activity that Title VII and related statutes are designed to protect.”). 
13
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reasonable and good-faith belief that the opposed practice is unlawful.86  
The primary difference between participation and opposition is that 
participation activity typically involves a charge or a lawsuit being 
filed,87 while opposition activity typically covers conduct prior to the 
filing of a charge or a lawsuit.88  That seemingly trivial distinction 
matters greatly in the amount of protection each activity is afforded.89 
B. Administrative Law 
Through Title VII, Congress created a regulatory body to oversee 
its implementation—the EEOC.90  While the primary source of guidance 
in Title VII cases is the statutory text,91 courts give deference to the 
EEOC compliance manual in cases where the statute is unclear.92 
The EEOC manual states that participation “applies to individuals 
challenging employment discrimination under the statutes enforced by 
EEOC . . . and to individuals who testify or otherwise participate in such 
proceedings.”93  The manual asks one question to determine whether a 
person is participating:  “Did the [complaining party] or someone closely 
associated with [her] file a charge, or testify, assist, or participate in any 
 
 86. Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass’n Inc., 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that an 
employee need not prove that the opposed conduct is actually unlawful, but must have a reasonable 
good-faith belief that the conduct is unlawful). 
 87. EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 70, Section 8-II(C)(2) (“While the opposition 
clause applies only to those who protest practices that they reasonably and in good faith believe are 
unlawful, the participation clause applies to all individuals who participate in the statutory 
complaint process.”). 
 88. Id. at Section 8-II(B)(2). 
 89. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. 
 90. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-4. 
 91. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002).  “In the absence of 
an indication to the contrary, words in a statute are assumed to bear their ‘ordinary, contemporary, 
common meaning.’”  Id. (quoting Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207 
(1997)). 
 92. Federal Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 (2008). 
The Federal Government interacts with individual citizens through all but countless 
forms, schedules, manuals, and worksheets. Congress, in most cases, delegates the 
format and design of these instruments to the agencies that administer the relevant laws 
and processes.  An assumption underlying the congressional decision to delegate 
rulemaking and enforcement authority to the agency, and the consequent judicial rule of 
deference to the agency's determinations, is that the agency will take all efforts to ensure 
that affected parties will receive the full benefits and protections of the law. 
Id. at 406-07. 
 93. EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 70, Section 8-II(C)(1).  The manual further 
defines the types of activities associated with participation:  “Protection under the participation 
clause extends to those who file untimely charges.  In the federal sector, once a federal employee 
initiates contact with an EEO counselor, (s)he is engaging in “participation.”  Id. 
14
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manner in an investigation, proceeding, hearing, or lawsuit under the 
statutes enforced by the EEOC?”94  If the answer to that question is yes, 
the employee is protected against retaliation by her employer.95  Per the 
EEOC, “[t]he anti-discrimination statutes do not limit or condition in 
any way the protection against retaliation for participating in the charge 
process.”96 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The position that Niswander argued in her brief to the Sixth Circuit 
is the position taken in this note:  in determining whether a Title VII 
litigant is participating in a protected activity, the relevance of any 
documents she produces is irrelevant when she is responding to a formal 
request for production.97  What is important is whether she objectively 
responded to the formal production request in good faith.98  The 
relevance of the documents provided should not matter to what is 
objectively an act of participation.99  The question of whether Niswander 
acted in good faith should have been presented to a jury.100 
This argument does not suggest that an employee should be 
immunized from adverse employment actions when disclosing 
confidential documents in discovery.101  Instead, to balance the concern 
of protecting the employer’s maintenance of confidentiality with the 
employee’s right to participate in Title VII proceedings, the court should 
focus on the pretext analysis of the employer’s stated reason for 
terminating the employee.102  Where an employer is legitimately and 
sufficiently motivated to take an adverse employment action against an 
employee for her disclosure of confidential documents, that employee 
can be legally terminated from her employment.103 
 
 94. Id. at Section 8-I(B). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at Section 8-II(C)(2). 
 97. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 17. 
 98. See infra notes 118-60 and accompanying text.  A good faith standard was not argued by 
Niswander, but instead is an argument proposed by this note.  See Final Brief for Appellant, supra 
note 17. 
 99. See infra notes 118-60 and accompanying text. 
 100. See infra notes 118-60 and accompanying text. 
 101. See infra notes 172-92 and accompanying text. 
 102. See infra notes 172-92 and accompanying text. 
 103. See infra notes 172-92 and accompanying text. 
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A. Congressional Intent 
The Sixth Circuit held that production of confidential documents in 
response to a formal discovery request does not constitute participation 
in a protected activity unless the produced documents are relevant.104  
The holding unfairly requires a lay participant in a Title VII action to 
make a legal determination as to the relevance of any documents she 
turns over.105  The decision makes no exception for the fact that 
Niswander reasonably believed she was responding in good faith to 
CIC’s broad request for discovery.106  The fact that Niswander did not 
believe the documents were directly related to the equal pay claim was 
fatal to her claim that she was participating in a protected activity.107 
By interjecting a relevance test into the production of documents in 
discovery, the Sixth Circuit has provided employers with the discretion 
to fire an employee based on the quality of the employee’s 
participation.108  Congress did not intend for such a restriction when 
drafting the anti-retaliation provision.109 
In drafting Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, Congress intended 
to provide exceptionally broad protection.110  The statutory language 
 
 104. Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 722 (6th Cir. 2008).  “An individual's 
delivery of relevant documents during the discovery process or the giving of testimony at a 
deposition clearly falls within the ambit of participating ‘in any manner’ in a Title VII proceeding.”  
Id. (citing Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 105. Id.; see infra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.  Although one may argue that 
Niswander’s attorneys could have determined whether the documents were relevant, CIC’s alleged 
reason for firing Niswander was that she produced the confidential documents to a third-party 
(Niswander’s attorneys) for a non-business purpose.  Niswander, 529 F.3d at 728.  In CIC’s view, it 
was up to Niswander to determine what documents were legally relevant to the request for 
production without assistance of counsel.  Id. 
 106. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 14. 
 107. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 721.  Niswander admitted that she had no documents to support an 
equal pay claim.  Id.  “This admission is fatal to her argument that her conduct should be deemed 
participation(.)”  Id. 
 108. Id. at 722.  Justice McKeague suggests in his concurring opinion that an employee must 
always preserve evidence in a way that will not violate the employer’s confidentiality policy.  
Niswander, 529 F.3d at 729 (McKeague, J., concurring). 
 109. See infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text. 
 110. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006 (5th Cir. 1969).  (“The 
protective provisions of Title VII are substantially broader than even those included in the Fair 
Labor Standards Act and the National Labor Relations Act in that, in addition to protecting charges 
and testimony, Title VII also specifically protects assistance and participation. This indicates the 
exceptionally broad protection intended for protestors of discriminatory employment practices. The 
protection of assistance and participation in any manner would be illusory if employer could 
retaliate against employee for having assisted or participated in a Commission proceeding.”); see 
also EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 70, Section 8-II(D)(3) (“The anti-retaliation provisions 
are exceptionally broad.”). 
16
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protects anyone who has testified or participated “in any manner.”111  
This wording has been broadly interpreted:112 
The anti-retaliation provision is straightforward and expansively 
written.  Congress chose the language “testified” and “participated in 
any manner” to express its intent about the activity to be protected 
against retaliation.  The word “testified” is not preceded or followed by 
any restrictive language that limits its reach.  As to “participated in any 
manner”, the adjective “any” is not ambiguous; it has a well-
established meaning.  Earlier this year, the Supreme Court explained, 
“Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, 
‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’ ” . . . “Congress did 
not add any language limiting the breadth of that word,” so “any” 
means all.113 
Had Congress desired, it may have protected participation “in any 
relevant manner”; the fact that Congress chose not to evidences its desire 
for broad sweeping protection against employer retaliation.114  Where 
statutory language is clear and the statutory scheme is coherent and 
consistent, the court typically does not need to conduct an in-depth 
analysis.115 
Title VII’s anti-retaliation statute specifically protects participation 
“in any manner” and in no way limits participation on the basis of 
relevance.116  The better standard to judge participation is not relevance, 
but good faith.117 
B. Good Faith Analysis 
When it comes to the production of confidential documents in Title 
VII discovery, plaintiffs should receive protection from employer 
 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 112. See Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that the explicit language 
of the participation clause is expansive and seemingly contains no limitations); see also Clover v. 
Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1353 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the words “participate in 
any manner” indicate broad Congressional intent). 
 113. Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States 
v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (internal citations omitted)). 
 114. Glover v. South Carolina Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999).  
“Congress could not have carved out in clearer terms this safe harbor from employer retaliation.”  
Id.  The Fourth Circuit found the statutory language so clear that it forecloses the improvisation of 
any further requirement.  Id. 
 115. U.S. v. Wildes, 120 F.3d 468, 470 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing U.S. v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 
(1997)); see also Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992). 
 116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 117. See infra notes 118-60 and accompanying text. 
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retaliation as long as they are responding to the production request in 
good faith.118  First, a Title VII participant may not know the legal 
relevance of the documents she is producing; however, she knows 
whether she is acting in good faith.119  Second, a good faith standard 
will alleviate one primary concern of the Sixth Circuit:  the 
immunization of bad faith conduct.  On the other hand, a relevance 
standard may actually uphold the future production of documents in bad 
faith.120 
1.  Good Faith v. Relevance 
The purpose of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is to give a lay 
person unfettered access to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms.121  A lay 
person cannot be expected to know whether a document is legally 
relevant,122 thus, it is unfair to impose such a standard on a Title VII 
plaintiff.123  For example, Niswander allegedly violated CIC’s 
confidentiality policy because she turned irrelevant documents over to 
her attorneys.124  Thus, CIC implicitly required that Niswander know 
what documents were legally relevant to the production request before 
she disclosed them to her attorneys.125  The relevance of documents is a 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that a party may obtain discovery 
regarding “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”  Relevant 
information does not need to be admissible, as long as the discovery request is “reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).  Meanwhile, 
good faith is defined as “A state of mind consisting in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2) 
faithfulness to one's duty or obligation, (3) observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable 
advantage.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
 120. See infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text. 
 121. EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 124 (1988).  The ADEA, like 
Title VII, sets up a “remedial scheme in which laypersons, rather than lawyers, are expected to 
initiate the process.”  Id.  “The system must be accessible to individuals who have no detailed 
knowledge of the relevant statutory mechanisms and agency processes.”  Federal Exp. Corp. v. 
Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 403 (2008). 
 122. Id.  It is important to note that Niswander was a claims adjuster with CIC. Thus, the 
argument could have been made in her case that she might have known the legal relevance of the 
documents.  Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 43, at *5-6.  Despite this fact, the goal of case 
law is to establish the law for the cases to come and not necessarily the cases at hand.  Glover, 170 
F.3d at 415.  The vast majority of Title VII litigants are lay people, not lawyers.  Commercial Office 
Products Co., 486 U.S. at 124. 
 123. Id.; see supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 124. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 728. 
 125. Id.  One reason Niswander claimed that CIC’s proffered non-discriminatory reason for 
terminating her was pretext is that CIC made no attempt to mitigate the alleged damage done by 
Niswander’s disclosure.  Id.  One of CIC’s arguments to counter that was that “the horse was out of 
18
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point that trained attorneys argue to a nuance in thousands of courtrooms 
every year.126  The effect of requiring a lay Title VII participant to 
understand what is legally relevant to her case without the help of her 
attorney does not fit within the overarching goal of the anti-retaliation 
statute—to allow unfettered access to Title VII’s remedial 
mechanisms.127  The better standard would be to allow the participant to 
produce the documents to her attorney so long as she is acting in good 
faith.128 
The Sixth Circuit’s primary reason for adopting the relevance 
requirement was that to do otherwise would insulate employees who 
engage in bad faith conduct.129  While this is certainly a valid concern, 
the Sixth Circuit’s remedy of adopting a relevance test on the production 
of confidential documents does not fully address that concern.130  If the 
documents that Niswander produced had been relevant to the discovery 
request under the Niswander decision, Niswander would have been 
considered “participating.”  Thus, the Sixth Circuit would have granted 
her “participant” status131 despite the fact that the Sixth Circuit had 
described her conduct as “the surreptitious theft of confidential 
documents as potential future ammunition(.)”132  The Sixth Circuit 
expressed disdain for Niswander’s conduct, while simultaneously 
establishing a rule that may, in future cases, immunize such conduct so 
long as the produced documents are relevant.133 
 
the barn.”  Id.  In essence, CIC was arguing that once Niswander turned the documents over to her 
attorneys, she violated CIC’s confidentiality policy and there was nothing they could have done to 
correct the disclosure.  Id. 
 126. As of March 9, 2010, Westlaw’s Keycite reports that there were 8195 cases that have 
cited to Federal Rule of Evidence 401 within the past year alone. 
 127. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. 
 128. See infra notes 129-60 and accompanying text. 
 129. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 722. 
 130. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text. 
 131. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 722.  “An individual's delivery of relevant documents during the 
discovery process or the giving of testimony at a deposition clearly falls within the ambit of 
participating ‘in any manner’ in a Title VII proceeding.”  Id. 
 132. Id.  Niswander lost the battle of characterization on this point given the fact that 
Niswander worked from home; she looked through the documents that she had in her home office. 
From the documents she had at home, Niswander produced several irrelevant and confidential 
documents that she believed supported a claim of retaliation.  Id. at 717-19. 
 133. Id. at 722. 
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2.  Good Faith Precedent 
In order to rid bad faith conduct from Title VII litigation, the better 
standard to apply is good faith.134  Title VII already imposes a good faith 
standard on opposition activity.135  An employee who opposes conduct 
that is not actually prohibited by Title VII is still protected under the 
opposition clause if she has a good faith belief that the opposed conduct 
was prohibited.136  Some courts have even imposed good faith 
requirements on participation activity.137 
In Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., an employee, Mattson, filed a 
sexual discrimination complaint against his supervisor, alleging that the 
supervisor had rubbed her breasts against his arm during a 
conversation.138  Mattson had testified in a prior investigation that he did 
not believe the touch to be intentional and that he did not believe that his 
boss was sexually attracted to him.139  Furthermore, a co-worker filed an 
affidavit concerning a conversation that occurred with Mattson in which 
Mattson stated that he had filed the complaint as a means to get his boss 
fired in “any way possible.”140  The Seventh Circuit found, as a matter 
of law, that Mattson had filed the complaint in bad faith.141  Despite the 
fact that the filing of a complaint is objectively an act of participation, 
the court held that an utterly baseless claim filed with malice cannot 
receive the protection afforded by the participation clause:142 
We believe that the same threshold standard should apply to both 
opposition and participation clause cases. That is, the claims must not 
be utterly baseless. Were we to adopt a different standard, an employee 
 
 134. See infra notes 134-59 and accompanying text. 
 135. Brannum v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 518 F.3d 542, 547 (8th Cir 2008). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891 (7th Cir. 2004); see also, Belt v. Alabama 
Historical Com’n, No. Civ.A. 04-0331-WSM, 2005 WL 1653728, at *9 (S.D.Ala. July 12, 2005).  
In Belt, the District Court commented that a good faith standard should be applied to both 
opposition and participation conduct and that the Plaintiff met a good faith standard in her conduct 
during a deposition. However, the Plaintiff still could not establish a prima facie case of retaliation 
because she did not suffer an adverse employment action.  Id. at *9-11. 
 138. Mattson, 359 F.3d at 887-88. 
 139. Id. at 888. 
 140. Id. at 889. 
 141. Id. “[T]he sexual harassment charge Mattson filed with the IDHR and EEOC was both 
objectively and subjectively unreasonable, as well as made with the bad faith purpose of retaliating 
against his female supervisor.”  Id. 
 142. Id. at 892.  (“[T]he unique circumstances of this case present us with a complaint that is 
not only unreasonable and meritless, but also motivated by bad faith. Against this factual backdrop, 
we find that Mattson's claim is not deserving of protection under the participation clause of Title 
VII. The paucity of case law on point illustrates the rarity of such claims as well as the limited 
nature of our holding.”). 
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could immunize his unreasonable and malicious internal complaints 
simply by filing a discrimination complaint with a government agency. 
Similarly, an employee could assure himself unlimited tenure by filing 
continuous complaints with the government agency if he fears that his 
employer will discover his duplicitous behavior at the workplace.143 
While ruling that a good faith standard should apply to participation 
activity, the court noted that the scope of its ruling would affect few 
Title VII cases given the relatively small amount of cases in which bad 
faith claims are presented.144 
In Mattson, the court examined what was objectively an act of 
participation, but articulated specific facts that showed that the 
participant was acting in bad faith.145  Applying a good faith standard to 
Niswander, the Sixth Circuit could have examined what motive 
Niswander had in producing the confidential documents.146  If the court 
could determine as a matter of law that Niswander acted in bad faith, the 
court could have declined to extend protection under the participation 
clause.147  Applying such an analysis would have alleviated one of the 
court’s primary concerns–immunizing future bad faith conduct of 
employees.148 
An example of bad faith conduct is the case of O’Day v. McDonnell 
Douglas Helicopter Co.149  Dealing with an act of opposition, O’Day is 
a quintessential example of bad faith conduct in Title VII.150  In that 
case, O’Day’s employer denied O’Day a promotion and O’Day believed 
that it was because of his age.151  That same night, O’Day broke into his 
supervisor’s office, rummaged through his supervisor’s private files, 
 
 143. Id. at 891. 
 144. Id. at 892. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 727 (6th Cir. 2008).  The court does 
briefly talk about Niswander’s motive in searching for these documents:  “Niswander specifically 
searched through the CIC documents that she had at her home office for the purpose of uncovering 
evidence of retaliation. Such behavior cannot be classified as truly innocent acquisition.”  Id. 
 147. Niswander likely would have survived a good faith analysis because she testified at her 
deposition that she provided the documents in response to the request for production because she 
believed that CIC wanted documents related to retaliation as well as equal pay.  Reply Brief of 
Appellant at 4, Niswander, 529 F.3d 714 (No. 07-3738).  Although Niswander provided irrelevant 
confidential information, unlike Mattson, there were no facts from which the court could infer 
malice.  Niswander, 529 F.3d at 722. 
 148. Id. 
 149. 79 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 150. Id.  O’Day is also the primary example that the Sixth Circuit compared Niswander’s 
behavior to in its opposition clause analysis.  Niswander, 529 F.3d at 723. 
 151. O’Day, 79 F.3d at 758. 
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copied certain documents, and showed them to fellow employees.152  
Even if O’Day had filed suit prior to searching his supervisor’s office, 
the court should not protect this type of bad faith conduct because it is 
not inherently a part of litigation.153 
One could argue that Congress’s desire for broad sweeping 
protection under the participation clause should include bad faith 
conduct.154  Indeed, there is case law supporting this proposition.155  
Examples of bad faith conduct that were deemed protected include filing 
a meritless charge,156 an unfounded charge,157 or even a malicious 
charge.158  Mattson represents a break from this view.159  However, for 
the same reasons that Mattson decided that an utterly baseless charge 
filed in bad faith was undeserving of participation clause protection, a 
court may decline protection to an employee’s acquiring and 
disseminating of confidential documents in bad faith.160 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. The court may actually sanction parties in Title VII under its inherent power to sanction 
where “the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”  
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 US 240, 258–59 (1975).  One bad faith 
sanction in Title VII is attorney’s fees.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k).  That subsection states: 
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow 
the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable 
attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs, and the Commission and the 
United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person. 
Id. 
 154. See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text. 
 155. See id. 
 156. EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), opinion 
supplemented, 420 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1977);  Hearth v. 
Metropolitan Transit Commission (M. T. C.), 436 F. Supp. 685 (D. Minn. 1977); EEOC Decision 
No. 71-1115, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 273 (E.E.O.C. 1971). 
 157. Bradington v. Int’l Business Machines Corp., 360 F. Supp. 845 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd, 492 
F.2d 1240 (4th Cir. 1974); EEOC Decision No. 71-1545, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 761 
(E.E.O.C. 1971). 
 158. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 159. See supra notes 145-60 and accompanying text. 
 160. Compare Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that a 
good faith standard applies to both the opposition and participation clauses), with O’Day v. 
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 1996) (declining opposition clause 
protection to an employee’s bad faith conduct).  In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., the 
United States Supreme Court left open the possibility of applying the bad-faith doctrine of unclean 
hands to Title VII claims.  513 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1995).  Though procedurally distinct, McKennon 
is factually similar to Niswander.  Id. at 354-55.  McKennon dealt with an employee who suspected 
that her employer was planning to fire her due to her age.  Id.  She subsequently copied several 
confidential documents in preparation for potential litigation.  Id.  McKennon’s bad faith conduct 
ultimately limited her recovery.  Id. at 362-63.  Procedurally, McKennon involved the after-acquired 
evidence doctrine.  Id. at 360-61.  The after-acquired evidence doctrine is used when an employer 
discovers evidence of employee wrongdoing that would have given the employer independent 
grounds to terminate the employee.  Id.  The doctrine is not a pure defense to an employee’s claim 
22
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C. Protecting Employer Confidentiality 
Another concern of the Sixth Circuit was that the documents at 
issue were confidential, thus, higher standards were needed to protect 
against unauthorized dissemination.161 However, unauthorized 
dissemination should not have been a significant issue in Niswander 
because the documents were produced as part of a formal discovery 
request.162  The documents were given to officers of the court 
(Niswander’s attorneys) who were bound by a protective order not to use 
any confidential documents exchanged in discovery for any improper 
purpose.163 
One aspect of modern litigation is the advent of protective orders in 
guarding corporate confidentiality.164  The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure specifically state that a court may require “that a trade secret 
or other confidential research, development, or commercial information 
not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way.”165  The Sixth 
Circuit held that Niswander could have preserved the documents without 
producing them to her attorneys.166  However, the court scarcely 
commented on whether the production of the documents caused actual 
damage.167  The court never commented on the fact that there was a 
 
of retaliation.  However, once the employer discovers the independent grounds for termination the 
employee’s damages for lost wages ceases to accumulate further.  Id. 
 161. Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 722 (6th Cir. 2008).  “Allowing too much 
protection to employees for disclosing confidential information may perversely incentivize behavior 
that ought not be tolerated in the workplace-namely, the surreptitious theft of confidential 
documents as potential future ammunition should the employee eventually feel wronged by her 
employer.”  Id. 
 162. One problem for Niswander is that she lost the battle of characterization on this argument.  
Id. at 726.  The Sixth Circuit refused to examine Niswander’s conduct as part of a formal discovery 
request because the documents produced were non-responsive.  Id.  The court analyzed Niswander’s 
production as if it had occurred outside the formal discovery structure of the court.  Id. 
 163. Id. at 727.  In analyzing the opposition clause, the Sixth Circuit found that Niswander 
providing the documents to her attorneys was not as problematic as disclosing them to a co-worker. 
However, the court felt that there were better means available for Niswander to preserve the 
documents. Thus, her production was not reasonable.  Id. 
 164. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 727. “Niswander's providing the documents to her Rochlin 
attorneys is less problematic than giving them to a fellow employee. But in light of the fact that 
Niswander had alternative means to inform her Rochlin counsel of the alleged retaliation, her 
behavior cannot be condoned simply because she limited the dissemination of the documents in 
question to her attorneys.”  Id. 
 167. The court had already ruled that Niswander could not establish a prima facie claim of 
retaliation by the time it discussed Niswander’s pretext argument, thus, the court did not 
significantly analyze this point.  Niswander, 529 F.3d at 728.  However, Niswander argued heavily 
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protective order, which allowed the parties to exchange confidential 
information.168 
Protective orders are, obviously, an ever-expanding feature of 
modern litigation 
. . . Protective orders recognize that parties engaged in litigation do not 
sacrifice all aspects of privacy or their proprietary information simply 
because of a lawsuit. But there remains a concomitant principle 
favoring full, fair, and open disclosure of the important matters 
occurring in the public's courts.169 
If genuine damage had been done to CIC or its clients by 
Niswander’s production of confidential documents, CIC could have 
placed the documents under the protective order of the court or 
otherwise availed itself of the protection that the court may afford to 
discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).  CIC’s failure to take steps to 
protect the confidential documents gives rise to Niswander’s argument 
that CIC was not sufficiently motivated by the document disclosure to 
terminate Niswander.170  In other words, CIC’s stated reason was 
pretext.171 
The protective order is just one way the court can protect an 
employer’s interest in confidentiality.172  Another way to balance the 
interests of the employer’s confidentiality with the protection provided 
 
in her brief that the alleged damage from the dissemination of documents was minimal.  Final Brief 
for Appellant, supra note 17, at 28-30. 
 168. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 8.  The protective order stated that “[e]ither 
party, may at the time of production, designate such information as ‘confidential’ and the 
information so designated shall thereafter be subject to the provisions of this order.”  Id. 
 169. In re Mirapex Products Liability Litigation, 246 F.R.D. 668, 672-73 (D. Minn. 2007). 
 170. An interesting fact not briefed to the Sixth Circuit is that Niswander was not the first 
person to be terminated for producing confidential documents in the context of the equal pay case.  
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment as to Claims Brought by 
Plaintiff Mary Slover, Rochlin v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. IP001898C H/K, 2005 WL 1025776 (S.D. 
Ind.  Apr. 7, 2005).  Def's. Memorandum in Support of Mot. for Summ. J., Rochlin v. Cincinnati 
Ins. Co., 2005 WL 1025776 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 7, 2005) (No. 01-01898). In September 2005, 
approximately three months before CIC terminated Niswander, another equal pay litigant was fired 
for producing confidential documents in response to a formal request for production.  Id.  “On 
September 26, 2005, [CIC] terminated Slover's employment because Slover was providing 
confidential and proprietary information directly to her counsel without CIC's knowledge or 
permission in violation of CIC's policies.”  Id.  A third equal pay participant was also fired for the 
same reason as Niswander.  See Niswander v. Price, Waicukauski & Riley, LLC, No. 
1:2008cv01325 (S.D. Ind. filed Oct. 2, 2008). 
 171. See infra notes 172-92 and accompanying text. 
 172. In re Mirapex, 246 F.R.D. at 672. 
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by the anti-retaliation provision is for courts to evaluate the production 
of confidential documents under a pretext analysis.173 
Since the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, Title VII retaliation cases have employed a 
burden-shifting mechanism.174  Once an employee establishes her prima 
facie case of retaliation, the burden is then shifted to the employer to 
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for taking the adverse 
employment action.175  To establish a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason, the employer must point to particular facts upon which it 
reasonably relied on in making its decision to terminate the employee.176  
The employer must also express why it was reasonable for the employer 
to rely on the stated facts.177  After the employer articulates its reason, 
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s 
stated reason was pretext.178  An employee may show pretext in one of 
the following three ways:  1) the stated reason has no actual basis in fact; 
2) the stated reason did not actually motivate the employer to take the 
adverse employment action; or 3) the stated reason did not sufficiently 
motivate the employer to take the adverse employment action.179 
CIC’s proffered reason for firing Niswander was that she violated 
the company’s code of conduct by producing confidential documents to 
 
 173. See infra notes 174-92 and accompanying text. 
 174. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 175. Id. at 802. 
 176. Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 2006).  Under the “honest 
belief” doctrine, adopted in some circuits, an employee cannot show pretext if the employer 
honestly believed that the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason was a basis for firing the employee.  
Id.  The Sixth Circuit has adopted a modified doctrine that requires the employer to state the 
particular facts upon which it believed and why its belief was reasonable in taking the adverse 
employment action.  Id. (citing Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806 (6th Cir. 1998)). 
 177. Id. 
In determining whether an employer reasonably relied on the particularized facts then 
before it, we do not require that the decisional process used by the employer be optimal 
or that it left no stone unturned.  Rather, the key inquiry is whether the employer made a 
reasonably informed and considered decision before taking an adverse employment 
action.  Although we will not micro-manage the process used by employers in making 
their employment decisions, we also will not blindly assume that an employer's 
description of its reasons is honest.  Therefore, when the employee is able to produce 
sufficient evidence to establish that the employer failed to make a reasonably informed 
and considered decision before taking its adverse employment action, thereby making its 
decisional process unworthy of credence, then any reliance placed by the employer in 
such a process cannot be said to be honestly held. 
Id. at 708 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 178. Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 179. Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 592 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Dews v. 
A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1021 (6th Cir. 2000)). 
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a third-party for purposes other than company business.180  Niswander 
responded to this argument by first alleging that CIC’s proffered reason 
had no basis in fact because Niswander produced documents in response 
to CIC’s request and, thus, CIC authorized the release.181  Niswander 
also argued that CIC was not sufficiently motivated to terminate her 
based on the fact that CIC took no action to remedy the alleged 
violation.182  CIC did not protect the documents by placing them under 
the court’s protective order.183  CIC’s attorney in charge of privacy did 
not conduct an investigation concerning the alleged violation, did not 
contact any of the customers whose alleged privacy was violated, and 
did not even look at the documents which were produced.184 
Having already declared Niswander’s conduct insufficient to 
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the Sixth Circuit briefly 
analyzed Niswander’s pretext argument and determined that Niswander 
could not show that CIC’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason was 
pretext.185  What is important in their discussion of pretext is that the 
Sixth Circuit could have protected CIC’s interest in maintaining the 
confidential documents by accepting CIC’s proffered nondiscriminatory 
reason for terminating Niswander.186  The court noted that CIC’s 
proffered reason had a basis in fact because Niswander was not 
technically responding to the production request when she produced 
confidential documents.187  The court went on to comment that CIC was 
actually motivated by Niswander’s violation of company policy and that 
 
 180. Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 43, at 34. 
 181. The provision in CIC’s Code of Conduct which Niswander relied on states:  “Associates, 
officers and directors may not transmit confidential information to any other person, internal or 
external, except when disclosure is legally mandated, authorized by the company or required for the 
proper conduct of business.”  Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 26. 
 182. Id. at 28-30. The insufficient motivation argument is best characterized in the following 
passage:  “We have held that when an employer . . . waits for a legal, legitimate reason to 
fortuitously materialize, and then uses it to cover up his true, longstanding motivations for firing the 
employee, the employer's actions constitute the very definition of pretext.”  Hamilton v. General 
Elec. Co., 556 F.3d 428, 436 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Jones v. Potter, 488 F.3d 397, 408 (6th Cir 
2007) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 183. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at *28. 
 184. Id. at *31. 
 185. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 728.  Whether the court properly analyzed Niswander’s pretext 
claim is beyond the scope of this note. However, the Sixth Circuit failed to analyze the third prong 
of pretext.  Id.  The Court properly analyzed whether CIC’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason had 
a basis in fact and whether the document production actually motivated CIC’s decision to terminate 
Niswander.  But, the Court never analyzed the primary argument Niswander made in regards to 
pretext—whether Niswander’s conduct sufficiently motivated CIC.  Id.; see also, Final Brief for 
Appellant, supra note 17, at *28-30. 
 186. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 728. 
 187. Id. 
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Niswander failed to present evidence to the contrary.188  By analyzing 
this case as an issue of pretext, the Sixth Circuit could have accepted 
Niswander’s production as participation for the purposes of establishing 
a prima facie retaliation claim, while also accepting CIC’s legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Niswander.189 
An employer has a legitimate interest in protecting the 
confidentiality of its documents.190  Focusing on whether that interest 
actually or sufficiently motivates the employer to fire an employee for 
disseminating such documents could sufficiently protect both the 
employer’s interest in maintaining confidentiality as well as the 
employee’s right to participate in Title VII proceedings.191  The Sixth 
Circuit could have addressed its concern over protecting employer 
confidentiality by analyzing employee conduct within the framework of 
pretext.192 
D. Analysis of Other Circuits 
In Glover v. South Carolina Law Enforcement Div., the Fourth 
Circuit extended protection under the participation clause to wholly 
irrelevant deposition testimony. 193  Glover dealt with a deponent who 
discussed matters concerning her boss outside the scope of the 
underlying Title VII claim upon which she was called to testify.194  
Although Glover discussed irrelevant matters during her deposition, the 
Fourth Circuit held that Glover was protected under the participation 
clause because the relevance of her statements did not change the fact 
that she was participating in a deposition.  Participating in a deposition 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 727-28 (holding that summary judgment was proper even if Niswander could have 
established a prima facie case of retaliation). 
 190. Id. at 726 (quoting Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1036 
(5th Cir. 1980)).  An employer has a “legitimate and substantial interest in keeping its personnel 
records and agency documents confidential.”  Id. 
 191. See supra notes 173-90 and accompanying text. 
 192. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 728.  The Sixth Circuit found that Niswander’s conduct in 
violating CIC’s confidentiality gave CIC a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to terminate 
Niswander.  Id. at 727-28. 
 193. 170 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, 528 U.S. 1146 (2000). 
 194. Id. at 412.  (“Glover freely offered not only facts directly related to [her supervisor’s] 
problems with the South Dakota marshals’ office, but also her impressions of the operations of the 
South Carolina marshals’ office. In particular, Glover perorated upon the perceived failings of her 
successor as the South Carolina U.S. Marshal, Israel Brooks. During the course of her testimony 
Glover accused Brooks of mismanagement, destruction of office documents, wasting funds, 
inappropriate behavior, dishonesty, and discrimination.”). 
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was clearly an act of participation.195  The application of Title VII’s 
participation clause does not depend on the substance of the 
participation.196  “A straightforward reading of the statute's unrestrictive 
language leads inexorably to the conclusion that all testimony in a Title 
VII proceeding is protected against punitive employer action.”197 
Similar to CIC’s argument in Niswander, the South Carolina Law 
Enforcement Division (“SLED”) argued that because Glover’s testimony 
was irrelevant to her Title VII claim, her behavior was unreasonable and 
thus should not constitute participation.198  Even assuming that Glover’s 
testimony was irrelevant, the Fourth Circuit still rejected SLED’s 
argument by refusing to separate the relevance of a person’s testimony at 
a deposition from the objective act of testifying.199  In responding to 
SLED’s proposed reasonableness standard, the court declared that: 
Reading a reasonableness test into section 704(a)'s participation clause 
would do violence to the text of that provision and would undermine 
the objectives of Title VII200 . . . Congress has determined that some 
irrelevant and even provocative testimony must be immunized so that 
Title VII proceedings will not be chilled.201 
In Niswander, however, the Sixth Circuit suggested that a 
reasonableness test can be applied to participation.202  The court held 
that “[t]he analysis of a participation claim does not generally require a 
finding of reasonableness . . . [b]ut when confidential information is at 
 
 195. Id. at 413. 
 196. Id. at 414. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 413.  The arguments presented by CIC in Niswander and SLED in Glover are 
strikingly similar.  Compare Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(arguing that irrelevant document production should not constitute participation), with Glover, 170 
F.3d 411 (arguing that irrelevant deposition testimony should not constitute participation).  In both 
cases the Title VII claimant’s participation was clearly irrelevant to the Title VII litigation.  Id.  In 
both cases the Defendants argued that irrelevant participation must meet a reasonableness test.  Id. 
 199. Id. at 415. 
The plain language of the participation clause itself forecloses us from improvising such 
a reasonableness test.  The clause forbids retaliation against an employee who “has made 
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner” in a protected proceeding.  
Glover was fired because she “testified” in a Title VII deposition.  The term “testify” has 
a plain meaning:  “[t]o bear witness” or “to give evidence as a witness.” 
Id. at 414 (internal citations omitted). 
 200. Id. at 414. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 726.  Because the court had already declared that Niswander’s 
actions did not constitute participation, its holding that a reasonableness test could be applied to 
participation was in dicta.  Id. 
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issue, a reasonableness requirement is appropriate.”203  The Sixth 
Circuit’s holding in Niswander is similar to that of the dissent in 
Glover.204  Like the Sixth Circuit, Judge Williams’ dissent was primarily 
concerned with the negative effects of immunizing bad-faith conduct of 
employees.  Thus, he felt a reasonableness test was appropriate.205  In 
the majority opinion of Glover, Chief Judge Wilkinson responds to the 
dissent by stating: 
Our good colleague in dissent fails to address the broad wording of the 
statute.  Instead, the dissent subscribes to a nebulous rule of reason 
which, while it may seem clear in this case, will be anything but clear 
in the long line of cases to come.  The statute permits an employee to 
be discharged for a wide variety of deficiencies in performance, but it 
does not subject an employee's testimony in a Title VII suit to the 
uncertain limbo of an employer's perception of its reasonableness.206 
That same reasoning should apply to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Niswander— a broad request for production implicates broad relevance. 
“The anti-discrimination statutes do not limit or condition in any 
way the protection against retaliation for participating in the charge 
process.”207  The plain language of the anti-retaliation statute does not 
contain limiting words.208  Interjecting a relevance requirement into the 
participation clause is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and 
opens the door to uncertainty.209  An employer should not have the right 
to discharge an employee who is objectively participating in a Title VII 
lawsuit based on the relevance of her participation.210 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. Compare Niswander, 529 F.3d at 726 (finding a reasonableness test appropriate), with 
Glover, 170 F.3d at 416 (Williams, J., dissenting) (arguing that irrelevant deposition testimony 
should be analyzed under a reasonableness standard). 
 205. In dissent, Judge Williams states:  “Congress surely did not intend to give asylum to 
employees to gratuitously disparage and maliciously accuse their peers of professional misconduct 
having nothing whatsoever to do with the underlying charge of discrimination, simply because the 
comments were made during a deposition in a Title VII proceeding.”  Glover, 170 F.3d at 416.  
Compare that with the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Niswander:  “[C]oncluding that Niswander's 
conduct here is protected participation . . . would provide employees with near-immunity for their 
actions in connection with antidiscrimination lawsuits, protecting them from disciplinary action 
even when they knowingly provide irrelevant, confidential information . . . .”  Niswander, 529 F.3d 
at 722. 
 206. Glover, 170 F.3d at 415. 
 207. EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 70, Section 8-II(C)(2). 
 208. Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 203-04 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 209. Glover, 170 F.3d at 414. 
 210. Id. at 414-15. 
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In a case on point, the Middle District of North Carolina held in 
dicta that: 
Disclosure of confidential information in response to a formal request 
for production would arguably receive extensive protection under Title 
VII because the court could take steps to protect the business interests 
of the employer by sealing documents, issuing protective orders, 
restricting the admissibility of evidence at trial, and conducting in 
camera proceedings where appropriate.211 
Courts should not separate irrelevant documents from the objective 
act of producing those documents.212  When you have a formal discovery 
request, there are sufficient safeguards in place within the court system 
to protect employers from an employee producing confidential 
documents.213 
E. Effect on Title VII Discovery 
One purpose of the anti-retaliation provision is to allow a person to 
have the freedom to communicate discrimination concerns with her 
employer.214  “[E]ffective enforcement could thus only be expected if 
employees felt free to approach officials with their grievances.”215  
Placing conditions on discovery will not facilitate such communication 
and could impose hurdles on a plaintiff proving her case.216  “[T]he 
imposition of unnecessary limitations on discovery is especially to be 
avoided in Title VII cases, because of the nature of the proofs required to 
demonstrate unlawful discrimination may often be indirect or 
circumstantial.”217 
 
 211. Shoaf v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 746, 757 (M.D.N.C. 2003).  The court in 
Shoaf found against the plaintiff primarily because she produced the documents outside a formal 
production request. See id. 
 212. Glover, 170 F.3d at 415. 
 213. Indeed, one of Niswander’s arguments was that the protective order protected her 
disclosure from causing any harm to CIC and thus CIC lacked sufficient motivation to fire her.  
Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 28.  “The parties had adopted a Stipulated Protective 
Order under which either party could mark documents confidential placing those documents under 
the protective order at the time of production.  If CIC was truly concerned about confidentiality and 
privacy, it would have marked the documents confidential under the protective order, but it did not.”  
Id. 
 214. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). 
 215. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960)). 
 216. Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 117, 119 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 217. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
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Furthermore, the ruling in Niswander arguably creates perverse 
incentives.218  The ruling encourages defendants to make overly broad 
requests for discovery in hopes that the plaintiff may violate the 
company’s privacy policy.219  At that point, the defendant will have a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to terminate the plaintiff.220  In fact, 
CIC terminated three of the equal pay litigants for allegedly violating its 
code of conduct.221   
Alternatively, plaintiffs will be reluctant to freely produce a 
document where the document’s relevance is questionable.222  Plaintiffs 
will have to vigorously examine all documents turned over in discovery 
in order to ensure that anti-retaliation protection remains in place.223  
While a plaintiff is not free to flood a defendant with irrelevant 
discovery,224 defendants should also not be able to hold plaintiffs under 
Damocles’s sword, terminating a plaintiff upon production of a single 
irrelevant document.225 
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit’s decision could impede the discovery 
process in EEOC actions.226  The policy for allowing irrelevant 
deposition testimony is equally applicable to allowing irrelevant 
production of documents: 
[T]o adopt a reasonableness restriction would lead the federal courts 
into a morass of collateral litigation in employment discrimination 
cases.  With her immunity limited by a reasonableness requirement, a 
witness might be forced to evade or to refuse to answer deposition 
questions. And those questions can be wide-ranging . . . . The 
inevitable clashes between inquisitive deposing attorneys and 
recalcitrant witnesses will spawn discovery motions and appeals, all to 
be litigated in the courts. The resulting waste of individual and judicial 
resources would be far inferior to a system in which discovery 
 
 218. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text. 
 221. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 222. Glover v. South Carolina Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 415 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Because a response to a formal request to produce documents must be signed by an 
attorney, flooding an opponent with irrelevant discovery can be sanctioned under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 11(c).  The rule explicitly prohibits the filing of any signed writing that is 
“presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly 
increase the cost of litigation.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).  Federal judges may also sanction improper 
conduct in discovery under FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b). 
 225. Glover, 170 F.3d at 415. 
 226. Id. 
31
Ledger: Relevance is Irrelevant
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
11_LEDGER_WESTERN 2.18.11.DOCM 2/22/2011  2:20 PM 
614 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:583 
proceeds unfettered, with witnesses confident that they cannot be 
punished for telling their tales.227 
The Sixth Circuit’s decision could cause the rate of discovery to 
slow because plaintiffs will be forced to meticulously analyze every 
document passed to a defendant.228  Likewise, defendants will be 
encouraged to request overly broad discovery.229  More discovery battles 
will occur where a plaintiff refuses to turn over a document when its 
relevance is questionable.230  The potential for wasting judicial resources 
is great.231  The better policy is to allow broad, unimpeded discovery.232 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In light of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Niswander and its recent 
adoption in other districts,233 the lawyer pursuing a Title VII claim for 
his client should be on guard.234  Plaintiffs’ lawyers should fully 
understand their client’s employer’s confidentiality policy before 
advising their client to take any action which may jeopardize her 
employment.235  Lawyers should also thoroughly counsel their clients as 
 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id.  One possibility to counteract such a result would be to adopt a rule akin to Federal 
Rule of Evidence 502(b), which was adopted in response to the concern that inadvertent disclosure 
of privileged documents would act as a waiver of attorney-client privilege.  FED. R. EVID. 502 
advisory committee’s note.  Rule 502(b) resolved the split over whether privilege could be restored 
after inadvertent disclosure.  Id.  One concern was that to do otherwise would grind document 
production to a halt while parties examined privilege, page by page.  Id. 
The rule does not require the producing party to engage in a post-production review to 
determine whether any protected communication or information has been produced by 
mistake.  But the rule does require the producing party to follow up on any obvious 
indications that a protected communication or information has been produced 
inadvertently. 
Id. 
 229. Glover, 170 F.3d at 415. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. See Harris v. Richland Community Health Care Ass’n, Inc., No. 3:07-0421-CMC-PJG, 
slip op. (D.S.C. Sept. 14, 2009) (finding Niswander instructive and adopting a reasonableness 
requirement when confidential documents are distributed outside of discovery); Quinlan v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 976 A.2d 429 (N.J. Super. 2009) (declining protection for an employee’s copying of 
confidential documents pre-suit); Johnson v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 682 F. Supp. 2d 
560 (E.D. Va. 2009) (adopting Niswander’s six-factor test in declining protection to an employee 
who disseminated documents to his attorney).  Although these cases are factually distinct from 
Niswander, they evidence a trend toward greater protection of employer confidentiality and thus, 
less protection for the Title VII plaintiff. 
 234. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. 
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to how the client may search for, and subsequently produce documents 
they come across in their continued employment.236  If confidential 
documents exist, the employee may provide the attorney with a synopsis 
of such documents so that the attorney may formally request their 
production.237  Counseling should include a specific warning that clients 
are not to go through confidential employer files for the purpose of 
litigation unless specifically authorized to do so.238 
Besides counseling the client, lawyers should request clarification 
when an employer’s request for production is overly broad and may 
involve confidential documents.239  When drafting a protective order in 
a Title VII case, lawyers for both sides should anticipate that 
confidential documents relating to the case may be in the hands of the 
employee and should draft language protecting the employee’s 
dissemination accordingly.240  Lawyers should also ensure that any 
confidential documents produced are marked as confidential.241 
As courts either adopt or reject relevance standards in Title VII 
participation, judges should consider protective orders as an alternative 
method for protecting employer confidentiality.242  When an employee 
is participating in good faith, the employee should be able to establish a 
prima facie case of retaliation.243  If an employee’s conduct shows cause 
for concern, the better analysis is not to deny that she was in fact 
participating, but instead to analyze whether her employer had a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her employment.244  
Combining a good faith standard in participation with a pretext analysis 
will both protect an employee who is legitimately participating in a Title 
VII action and provide the employer with protection when it has a 
legitimate reason for terminating a Title VII participant.245 
  
 
 236. Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 722 (6th Cir. 2008).  See supra note 49 
and accompanying text. 
 237. Johnson, 682 F.Supp.2d at 582. 
 238. See supra notes 25, 149-53 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra notes 22-24, 49-51 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra notes 18, 164-69 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra notes 161-62, 182-84 and accompanying text. 
 242. See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra notes 118-60 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra notes 172-92 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra notes 118-60, 172-92 and accompanying text. 
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